The European Union’s top court ruled that sports sanctions can directly interfere with the right to work, establishing boundaries for federations like Italy’s FIGC when banning executives from professional activity.
The July 16, 2026, decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) originated from two cases involving former Juventus executives who contested their two-year professional bans. The FIGC had accused them of participating in a scheme involving fictitious capital gains and approving inaccurate financial statements. When the federation extended the penalties through FIFA and UEFA, the bans became global, preventing the executives from working in soccer across the EU or elsewhere.
The CJEU determined that such bans create an obstacle to the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide services. The sanctions explicitly aimed to block economic activity, bringing them under EU labor protections. The issue extends beyond soccer’s internal regulations, raising questions about whether private sports bodies can halt someone’s career without judicial oversight.
The case reveals a conflict between the autonomy of sports organizations and EU law. Federations argue they require disciplinary authority to ensure fair competition and financial integrity. False financial records, the court noted, can distort a club’s actual financial health, impacting player transfers and team structure. However, the CJEU emphasized that autonomy does not grant unlimited power.
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The court did not dismiss the FIGC’s authority to impose bans outright. Instead, it introduced a proportionality test: penalties must be necessary, transparent, and subject to judicial review. A legitimate objective, such as protecting competition, does not justify any punishment. The length and severity of a ban must correspond to the offense, considering the executive’s role, the damage caused, and whether the penalty is appropriate.
The ruling also examined Italy’s system, which primarily offers financial compensation as a remedy. After exhausting internal appeals, executives could seek damages but could not challenge the ban itself. The CJEU found this insufficient. If the final sports tribunal lacks full judicial independence—including impartiality, legal grounding, and due process—courts must have the authority to provide an effective remedy. Money cannot replace a career.
The decision extends beyond soccer. It applies to any private organization—professional orders, trade associations—that holds disciplinary power over an individual’s livelihood. The court’s reasoning suggests that when a sanction affects mobility across EU borders, the right to an effective remedy outweighs deference to private governance. This marks a shift from treating sports penalties as internal matters to recognizing them as labor restrictions with tangible effects.
For executives facing disciplinary action, the decision offers a potential path to challenge sanctions that threaten their professional futures. Appeal requirements under EU law now include stricter scrutiny of proportionality and judicial independence.
